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The Rise and Fall of 
the Ordoliberal Left in Europe
Abstract
One of the most cherished myths of the ‘Third Way’ that remains 
in Britain and Europe is that social democracy had to change and 
embrace aspects of the neoliberal agenda because supply-side 
policy constraints laid out by the process of globalization and 
European integration were insurmountable. Similarly, in the 
wake of the global financial crisis and the eurozone crisis, this 
form of the Left embraced austerity, arguing that “There Is No 
Alternative” (TINA). Another, more sophisticated, branch of the 
Left looked at the EU as a field of socialist action for the imple-
mentation of a full-fledged Keynesian agenda. We challenge 
these false realisms. We argue that the neo-revisionist Third Way 
Left has failed on several counts, two of which are important for 
our purposes here. First, restructuring, and not just being con-
strained by the new contours of global and national capitalism, 
has always been an organic part of the supply-side. Second, by 
embracing the austerity agenda of ordoliberalism – a disciplinar-
ian form of neoliberalism put forth by German-Austrian intellec-
tuals and policy-makers – that had been inserted into the EU 
Treaties by Germany, this (ordoliberal) Left lost its constituency 
and attractiveness, contributing directly to the rise of the xeno-
phobic Right across Europe.
Keywords: Third Way, neoliberalism, ordoliberalism, Keynesian-
ism, financialization/globalization
Fo






For some time now, a well-informed argument has seen the 
convergence of the Third Way Blairite Left with the neoliberal 
Right buttressing supply-side economics as follows: the Left ad-
opted all major policy tenets abiding by the constraints of capi-
talist restructuring and neoliberal globalization because, having 
no choice, it had to adapt; Keynesian policy instruments could no 
longer be operational at the nation-state level, hence the realis-
tic adoption of the New Left programmatic agenda of ‘rights’ 
and ‘freedoms’, centred on the ‘rule of law’, ‘promotion of com-
petitive markets and healthy privatizations’, ‘flexible labour mar-
kets’ and so on. In other words, social democrats in Britain and 
elsewhere pursued a sensible neo-revisionist path from the 
1980s onwards, when they shifted their strategy from national 
Keynesianism to the embrace of the new constraints imposed by 
the new phase of financialized capitalism in Europe and the 
world. A landmark case in this respect was the famous U-turn of 
the French socialists in 1983, when Francois Mitterrand, unable 
to defend the Franc and compete with Germany in the EMS, had 
to devalue and abandon his nationalization program (Sassoon 
1996, 534-71). The Italian Communist Party itself, one of the 
most precious laboratories of the radical Euro-communist Left in 
Europe, changed its name and identity in 1989-1991 not because 
of the collapse of ‘really existing socialism’ but because of the 
changing contours of capitalism at national, European and global 
levels (Fouskas 1998). 
The global financial crisis, which trickled down to the euro-
zone via the inter-connected transatlantic banking sector (Lapa-
vitsas et al. 2010, 1-35), caught the followers of this type of ar-
gument, including the reformed Third Way Left, by surprise. As 
long as the neoliberal financialized model of capitalism in Eu-
rope and the world was doing well, the Third Way Left faced no 
major problems. Once the crisis kicked in, blowing up the entire 
transatlantic financial system at its core, triggering one of the 
greatest systemic depressions in modern capitalism, Third Way 
politics and rhetoric lost their attractiveness. This happened not 







crisis to the poor and the deprived, but also because it began to 
erode the class privileges and tax breaks of the middle classes, 
the real political and electoral base of this neo-centrist bi-parti-
san regime; and, indeed, every capitalist regime, as Marx point-
ed out long ago in his The 18th Brumaire (1852). The effects of 
the 2007-08 crisis were felt most strongly in the European pe-
riphery, as the European banking system of the core transferred 
its debt onto the taxpayers of Southern Europe and Ireland via a 
number of bailout agreements, imposing a bondage regime of 
austerity and discipline unparalleled in the history of the EU 
(Fouskas and Dimoulas 2012; Fouskas and Dimoulas 2013). As a 
consequence, large social strata, failing to find expression in the 
neoliberal Left and hit by austerity, turned to the radical and xe-
nophobic Right, although in some cases (namely Greece and 
Spain) they extended support to the radical Left. However, the 
trend of supporting extreme Right-wing movements and parties 
has been much stronger, and is exacerbated by new migration 
flows coming into Europe from the war zones of the broader 
Middle East and Central Asia. 
Despite the havoc inflicted on societies by the crisis of neo-
liberal globalization and European integration, one branch of the 
Third Way Left continues to subscribe to the main tenets of neo-
liberalism and its harsh austerity policy, seen as the only way out 
of the crisis. This branch of the Left has participated in govern-
ment as a reformist force of the capitalist market, serving the 
needs of neoliberal globalization and the extraction of financial 
profits, thereby contributing to the creation of the financial bub-
ble just as much as the neoliberal Right.
However, another more sophisticated branch of the Left, at 
times drawing from the tradition of Euro-communism, re-invent-
ed Euro-Keynesianism as a response to the eurozone crisis. What 
does this Euro-Left realism say? It criticizes the pro-European, 
Third Way Left from the Left, but it also criticizes radical currents 
of the Left that insist that socialism must first start from one 
country and then expand whenever possible and feasible, a posi-
tion articulated by Costas Lapavitsas (Lapavitsas 2018). Euro-Left 
realism entails: a fiscal union, a banking union, a generous in-
crease of the EU budget – which currently stands at just 1% of 
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the bloc’s GDP – pro-welfare reforms, official issuing of European 
bonds (debt), in short, the entire leftist Keynesian agenda at the 
EU level. This type of leftist politics is incarnated by such aggre-
gations as the DiEM25 led by Yanis Varoufakis, or large sections 
of Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party in Britain, but also other Left-
wing forces, not necessarily of a social democratic stock, some of 
which arguably even draw from the Trotskyite tradition. 
This chapter places the above discussion into a differing ana-
lytical framework. It shows that the ‘realisms’ of the Third Way 
Left and the Euro-Left are constitutive components in the devel-
opment of a specific neoliberal project in the scope of EU institu-
tion-building, a project for which we reserve the term ‘ordoliber-
alism’. Whether during its initial expansion phase in 1940s and 
1950s in Germany, or during the great boost it received after the 
stagflation of the 1970s and Mitterrand’s capitulation to German 
hegemony in the early 1980s, or even during its first serious set-
back when shaken by the eurozone crisis, ordoliberalism has been 
a stylized form of public policy spearheaded by Germany’s estab-
lishment and political system and successfully transplanted into 
the EU. By putting forth this original analytical framework, we 
show how ordoliberalism preceded Anglo-American neoliberal-
ism, conjured up theory and political practice, and recruited the 
social democratic Left, transforming it into an organic component 
of its Right-wing project. Neoliberalism and ordoliberalism have a 
great deal in common; however, the former applies more to An-
glo-American contexts and the latter to Germano-Austrian ones. 
The first section of this chapter outlines the key develop-
mental phases of ordoliberalism as an intellectual and practi-
cal-political movement. The second section lays out its key policy 
tenets, which, arguably, overlap with those of Anglo-American 
neoliberalism, not least because the latter stems from the scien-
tific-historical matrix of the former. Lastly, the ordoliberal evolu-
tion of the Left in Europe will be examined by focusing mainly on 
the German and the British Left(s). The conclusion provides a 
summing-up of a critique to the ‘post-Keynesian’ position of the 
Euro-Left, which believes that the Euro-system can be trans-
formed towards a progressive-socialist direction from within the 








Ordoliberalism is an intellectual and political movement 
whose origins can be traced back to interwar Germany and Austria. 
It formed an attempt to re-invent an inter-disciplinary and all-en-
compassing model of social and public policy conducive to practical 
policy application in order to steer the course of government away 
from the defunct liberalism of the 1920s (Bonefeld 2017; Fouskas 
and Roy-Mukherjee 2019; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Hien and Jo-
erges 2017). Towards the end of the Weimar Republic and after, 
many sociologists, economists, constitutionalists and other social 
scientists, not necessarily in contact with each other, began work-
ing on theoretical hypotheses drawing on liberal modern traditions 
of the previous centuries, but aiming to provide a synthesis going 
beyond those traditions. A notorious group centred around Franz 
Böhm and Walter Eucken was based at the University of Freiburg, 
hence the common attribution of ordoliberal thinking to the 
‘Freiburg School’. The key reference point for ordoliberals, and the 
politico-economic experience that had to be avoided, was the hy-
per-inflation of the Weimer Republic and the disorder brought 
about by its political, nearly anarchic, pluralism. The main aim of or-
doliberals in Austria and Germany in the 1930s came to be the for-
mation of a policy proposal that goes beyond the failed classical 
liberalism, but which is also different from the prevailing para-
digms of the ‘actually existing socialism’ and the vogue of Keynes-
ianism as incarnated in Roosevelt’s New Deal. At the same time, 
the majority of them opposed the organization of the German 
economy under the Nazi regime, despite the fact that the Nazis 
substantially improved the country’s economic performance; as did 
Mussolini’s fascism in Italy and, indeed, all the dictatorial regimes in 
Europe at the time. The ordoliberals were liberals but of a peculiar 
stock: as opposed to the free market/free trade liberalism of the 
19th century dominated by England, Austro-German ‘neoliberals’/
ordoliberals envisaged a social economy premised on order and an 
economic constitution that supports a healthy price mechanism 
and competition. Some ordoliberals opposed big cartels and mo-
nopolies. A view shared by all ordoliberal thinkers was that state in-
stitutions and strict legal rules are the mediums for instituting 
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order, and not the market itself via its spontaneous mechanisms. 
Markets undermine social and economic order and that is why a 
free economy requires a strong state in command and a robust artic-
ulation of political institutions and markets; an Ordnungsgefüge (ob-
jective order constellation), as Alfred Müller-Armack termed it in 
1932. This complex institutional nexus between the state and so-
cial economy draws on the ‘non-political’ disciplinarian rule of law, 
at the centre of which is a de-politicized central bank mechanism 
structured around an anti-inflation bias. Forms of authoritarian rule 
are allowed if/when the price mechanism, i.e. inflation, gets out of 
control and free markets and competition are under threat. This 
fundamental principle of ordoliberal thinking brought some of 
them, such as Müller-Armack himself, very close to the Nazi party 
and Carl Schmidt’s theory of the ‘state of exception’ (Scheuerman 
2015).
The ordoliberal reconstruction of liberal doctrines was formal-
ized to some degree in the notorious ‘Walter Lippmann Colloqui-
um’, or Colloque, held over five days in central Paris, from 26 to 30 
August 1938. Most arch-ordoliberals, from Friedrich August von 
Hayek to Alexander Rüstow and from Wilhelm Röpke to Ludwig 
von Mises, were there (Eucken was invited to attend, but the Nazi 
authorities did not give him a permission to leave Germany). Along 
with businessmen, French economists, and philosophers such as 
Raymond Aron, the Colloque launched effectively a neoliberal inter-
national collective, an effort that the war interrupted, but which 
was to be re-launched in the Swiss resort of Mont Pelerin in 1947 
under the leadership of Hayek (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009, 45-67). 
With the founding of the Mont Pelerin Society, ordoliberalism/neo-
liberalism gained prominence simply because it began to directly 
influence post-war political establishments in Europe and the USA. 
Milton Friedman attended the opening meeting of the Society, 
with this attributed with aiding the systematization of neoliberal 
economics at the University of Chicago in the 1950s, whereas Lud-
wig Erhard, West Germany’s Minister of Economic Affairs from 
1949 to 1963 and Chancellor from 1963 to 1966, joined Mont Pel-
erin in 1950.
Although descriptive and brief, the above discussion demolish-







stemming from the theories of Milton Friedman and implemented 
by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in Britain and the USA re-
spectively in the 1980s. Matters are rather far more complex, and 
many authors have reasonable historical grounds to argue that 
neoliberalism, in the form of ordoliberalism as it was shaped in in-
terwar Germany and Austria, preceded the neo-classical economics 
of the Chicago School (Kiely 2018, 35-94). Hence, Anglo-American 
neoliberalism resulted from the Germano-Austrian matrix of ordo-
liberalism, and not vice versa. Thus, both movements and policy 
proposals share many things in common, although ordoliberals 
tend to place greater emphasis upon the role of institutions and 
their disciplinarian and de-politicizing capacity via law, whereas (An-
glo-American) neoliberals do not see free markets as disruptive and 
disorderly. For our purposes here that, among others, aim at show-
ing the way in which German ordoliberalism was transposed onto 
EU treaties over the decades since the Treaty of Rome, the most 
significant contributions to ordoliberal theory and practice, espe-
cially as regards the construction of post-war Germany and Europe, 
are those of Hayek and Müller-Armack.
In a 1939 essay titled “The Economic Conditions of Interstate 
Federalism”, Hayek presented a blueprint on how a European fed-
eration could work by way of removing impediments to the free 
movement of “men, goods, and capital”, as he put it (Hayek 
1939/1947). As long as a ‘single market’ is in place, Hayek wrote, 
prices and wages would tend to match production costs across the 
continent. All that would be needed to achieve a balanced price 
system without state interference would be a federal regulatory 
framework whose aim would be to reduce – and even eliminate – 
state interference, undermining state support for domestic indus-
tries and eliminating independent monetary policies. Effectively, 
Hayek advocated the setting-up of a liberal framework of rules 
across Europe in order to eliminate the power of nation states, 
making them instead serve ‘interstate liberal-federal’ rules. From 
this perspective, national currencies and sovereignties disappear. 
Arguably, the ‘framework’ envisaged by Hayek adumbrates nothing 
more and nothing less than the binding neo-ordoliberal Treaties of 
the EEC/EC/EU, which, in a single market mechanism, eliminate the 
power of the nation states that signed up to those Treaties. In this 
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respect, monetary sovereignty is paramount: interstate federal 
principles dictate that a state’s central bank liquidity and interest 
rate is determined by the federation’s central bank that sits outside 
the jurisdiction of that state proper. Clearly, this indicates loss of 
monetary sovereignty, which is a fundamental aspect of national 
sovereignty. At the same time, it indicates democratic deficit be-
cause the federated central bank mechanism is over and above any 
socio-political control and check, unassailable by social struggle and 
political pressures that occur within the modern state. For Hayek 
and the ordoliberals, the price mechanism, that is, the control of in-
flation and the framework of rules within which a competitive or-
der can exist and thrive, was of utmost importance.
In post-war (West) Germany, Müller-Armack was directly in-
volved in shaping economic policy and directly contributing to the 
European project. He, under the command of the German Minister 
of Economic Affairs, Erhard, was Germany’s chief negotiator in the 
Treaty of Rome, which proclaims without hesitation “the establish-
ment of a regime ensuring that competition is not distorted in the 
common market”, facilitating an increase in the “competitive 
strength of enterprises”. To this end, state aid, considered a factor 
that distorts the price mechanism and the market, was to be pro-
scribed by the 1957 Treaty. Having established the basic economic 
liberties (free movement of people, capital, services and goods), 
the Treaty constitutionalized the ‘social market economy’ notion, 
Marktwirtschaft, put forth by the German negotiator already in 
1932. Ever since the Treaty of Rome, Marktwirtschaft represents 
the most fundamental aspect of Europe’s acquis, which is effective-
ly the EU’s Constitution, today endorsed by the European Court of 
Justice and upheld by the Commission and the Council.
To understand Marktwirtschaft it is important that one begins 
to understand society not as an organism divided into classes and 
constantly permeated by class struggle – in fact, a Marxist would 
argue that classes exists only through class struggle – but as an on-
tology premised on competition, whether individual or entrepre-
neurial (Peacock and Willgerodt 1989, 16-39). Müller-Armack ex-
plained that market is ‘social’ because it pleases the choices of the 
consumer and puts pressure, through competition, on enterprises 







end-product to be consumed. Keynesians and socialists criticized 
this by counter-arguing that such a postulate undermines social co-
hesion and solidarity and can be neither ‘social’ nor ‘socialist’ (Dar-
dot and Laval 2013, 90-1). Müller-Armack responded by saying that 
Marktwirtschaft is not the same as the notion of a liberal economy, 
because Marktwirtschaft is desired by society and represents a col-
lective choice. It is a social machine in need of a regulatory eco-
nomic constitution, because this type of regulation orders a fair 
competition between enterprises and checks the price mechanism. 
In addition, this regulation-institutional interference aims at form-
ing individuals responsible for their actions, not individuals expect-
ing to receive welfare benefits at the expense of the taxpayer. In 
effect, Marktwirtschaft treats the interests of the individual as 
identical to those of the market and the enterprise.1 However, in-
dividualism is something to be constructed and not left to the 
spontaneous mechanism of free markets. In this respect, Mark-
twirtschaft directly opposes the Keynesian welfare state and social-
ist alternatives, as well as laissez faire economics. However, because 
of the embeddedness of the Bismarckian welfare state in Germany, 
an embeddedness that persisted throughout the Cold War, the or-
doliberals had more success in Europe with this policy notion, in 
the long run, than in Germany itself. 
In the beginning, ordoliberals were faced by a couple of seri-
ous obstacles in Europe, especially during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Above all, they had to come to grips with the dominant position of 
Keynesian policy-making – with all its variations – within the nation 
states and the virtuous cycle of capitalist development – the so-
called ‘Golden Age of Capitalism’ (1945-1970). Due to the early 
stages of the process of European integration, ordoliberals had to 
strike a compromise with the principle of Marktwirtschaft, especial-
ly with the French who, despite having problems matching the 
dominant position of the German Mark (D-Mark) in the common 
market, were extremely hesitant to give away national power with-
out surrendering the D-Mark in an (exchange rate) mechanism 
1   This aspect is analysed brilliantly by Michel Foucault in his pioneering anal-
ysis of ordoliberalism as biopolitics (Foucault 1979/2010, 33-178).
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providing currency stability across the common market.2 Neverthe-
less, the ordoliberals had left an important imprint on the common 
market and its subsequent governing structures from the very be-
ginning: given that the institutions of the EU did not evolve in re-
sponse to class struggle and political-social pressures – its life be-
gan as a cartel of steel and coal which controlled prices and output 
by means of an unelected bureaucracy – it enjoyed all the requi-
sites to develop into a governing aggregation of rules and norms at 
a later stage, resembling the Germano-Austrian ordoliberal model 
of capitalism. The turning points were the collapse of Keynesianism 
in the stagflation (economic stagnation accompanied by high infla-
tion) of the 1970s and Francois Mitterrand’s U-turn in 1983 when, 
unable to compete with the D-Mark in the EMS, he abandoned his 
nationalization program and committed France to the single mar-
ket that adumbrated the Maastricht Treaty (1991-2) and the launch 
of the Euro in 1999 (2001 for Greece), the Growth and Stability 
Pact, formalized by the Council’s resolution in 1997, which repre-
sented a near-comprehensive set of ordoliberal rules. 
A few conclusions can be drawn from this before we return to 
our analyses of the Left. First, it is important to understand that 
Germano-Austrian ordoliberalism, as a systematic elaboration of a 
neoliberal thought collective in continental Europe, preceded An-
glo-American neoliberal thought and practice. This is highly signifi-
cant, because due to the linkages between ordoliberalism and poli-
cy-making, the German model of post-war capitalist development 
2   It was de Gaulle’s France that initially proposed a common currency. This 
was through de Gaulle’s Finance Minister, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who in 
March 1964 made such a proposal to his German counterpart, Kurt 
Schmücker. This came as a surprise to the Germans but this sort of 
semi-structured and rather secret meeting continued through to the 
1970s, when eventually an abortive European Monetary System (EMS) 
was established. Germany’s objection throughout had been that it was un-
able to give up its currency without first putting in place a political (Euro-
pean) union. De Gaulle’s primary aim was to undermine the dominant po-
sition of the dollar as a reserve currency, and he further wished to con-
nect Europe with the Soviet Union geo-politically. Henry Kissinger, who 
could see the dominant economic position (West) Germany was already 
assuming within the common market, asked de Gaulle how France would 
prevent Germany from dominating the continent. The General’s answer 








accommodated a number of neoliberal elements that British capi-
talism had not yet considered. Neoliberalism triumphed in Britain 
with the advent of Margaret Thatcher’s rise to power in 1979; 
Thatcher employed a policy similar to a kind of ‘shock therapy’, de-
stroying the industrial capacity of the country and building a social 
economy on the dominance of financial services and the banks. In 
Germany, the transition to a full-fledged ordoliberal-cum-neoliberal 
process took much longer, it was orderly and did not resort to de-
struction of the exporting industrial capacity of the country. During 
the Cold War, there was a constant fight between the dominance 
of Keynesianism and the advancement of ordoliberalism both in 
Germany and Europe. Müller-Armack’s Marktwirtschaft represented 
an unstable equilibrium of compromises with Keynesian poli-
cy-making and the centrality of the welfare state and nationalized 
industry. 
The stagflation of the 1970s shattered the Keynesian consen-
sus across Europe. This historical process enthroned ordoliberalism 
in power, formalized in the Single European Act of 1986-87 and the 
Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty is to be considered a tri-
umph of the Germano-Austrian ordoliberalism at the European lev-
el, and represents the structural and dominant power of German 
capitalism in Europe. From being a surplus state with a stable cur-
rency during the Cold War, Germany came to institutionalize its pri-
macy in Europe through a number of Treaties harking the launch of 
a single currency and a European Central Bank modelled after the 
Bundesbank. Obviously, the French had miscalculated (Lapavitsas 
2018, 5-9): the single currency they proposed in the 1960s turned 
out to be a camouflaged D-Mark under the watchful eye of a strict-
ly independent and ‘de-politicized’ European Central Bank, commit-
ted to anti-inflation policies – much the same as the Bundesbank. A 
Treaty commitment was that surplus countries, such as Germany, 
could not bail-out debtor countries, such as Italy or Greece. 
The second major point that needs to be made is that the con-
struction of the EU had been an anti-socialist project from the very 
beginning. Importantly, as the project was unfurled through the es-
tablishment of a binding ordoliberal framework of rules and norms 
undermining state sovereignty – Hayek’s blueprint – those signing 
up to those rules and norms were effectively entering an ‘iron 
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cage’ from which it was almost impossible to escape (Ryner 2015, 
275-294). Stemming from this, the key policy tenets of ordoliberal-
ism/neoliberalism as they result from our analyses are as follows:3 
1. Sound money and anti-inflation policies
2. Balanced budgets and exclusion of bailouts
3. Anti-trust legislation and (fair) competition policy
4. Complete independence of the central bank mechanism
5. Export-led growth
6.  Rule of law, social discipline and biopolitics through Mark-
twirtschaft
7.  Strong institutional framework (the ‘economic constitu-
tion’) embedded in – and ordering – free markets
Having said this, the economic and political Constitution of the 
EU is but a supply-side Constitution, overturning the demand-led 
democratic constitutional arrangements struck within the nation 
states of Europe under pressures arising from social struggle. From 
this perspective, the EU has always had a ‘democratic deficit’, a 
drawback transformed into straightforward authoritarianism as 
soon as the banking crisis appeared upon the horizon (Fouskas and 
Gökay 2019). 
The Making of the Ordoliberal Left: A Bird’s-Eye Glimpse
Political parties are agencies that always operate within a giv-
en set of material-institutional constraints laid out by national and 
international class structures and interests. At the same time, as ac-
tive participants of social and political struggle – and this is valid es-
pecially for the parties of the Left – they are in a position, at least in 
theory, to push the boundaries of those constraints, bringing them 
closer to the class interests that these parties are committed to. 
The Right has a moral and class obligation to push the boundaries 
3   It should be emphasized again that all of these policy tenets represent 
material constraints and constitutional commitments, and are inserted in 








towards the maximization of profit for enterprises, while holding 
onto political class power; the Left has a moral and class obligation 
to push those boundaries towards high wages and social welfare. 
The question of state power for the Left, a question distinct from 
that of governmental power, arises always at the level of the na-
tion state when a leftist political party is able to project the inter-
ests of the class it represents as broader popular-national interests 
– the issue of working class hegemony within the broad ensemble 
of subaltern classes – without relinquishing the primacy of the core 
class it represents; i.e. the working class.4 The question of social-
ism and state power arises from the moment that the subaltern 
classes can suppress the bourgeoisie and alter the relations of pro-
duction (property relations) and the markets corresponding to 
them. Historically, this issue has been posed only during radical-rev-
olutionary periods in world history (the Russian Revolution, the 
Chinese Revolution, the de-colonization period, the Cuban Revolu-
tion, etc.). Here, we confine ourselves to the case of the social 
democratic Keynesian Left.
Sadly, the Keynesian Left could not push the boundaries of 
capital accumulation towards a new balance of power between la-
bour and capital in favour of the former during the post-stagflation 
years. As we know, Right-wing parties did succeed in this, pushing 
towards neoliberal/ordoliberal globalization/financialization, be-
cause this was deemed to be the remedy for the falling tendency 
of the (average) rate of profit. But problems do not end here. The 
parties of the Left not only failed to push the class boundaries of 
capitalism in favour of the subaltern and working classes, but also 
contributed to the shaping and strengthening of those boundaries 
together with the neoliberal Right against the class and popular in-
terests they supposedly represented. Let us take a brief look at 
that process.
4   We accept the distinction between state power and governmental power. 
A Left-wing party may be in governmental power but without controlling 
key sections of the bourgeois state power, such as the Ministry of De-
fence or the Interior Ministry. This distinction was first put forth by Marx 
and later systematized by such Marxists as Nicos Poulantzas in the late 
1960s. Antonio Gramsci also elaborated on the issue of class hegemony 
in his Quaderni del Carcere (Prison Notebooks). The bibliography on these 
themes is immense. 
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The German Social Democratic Party (SPD) was not the kind of 
party that could push class boundaries in favour of the working class 
and its allies. Bound by its reformist-revisionist tradition of Eduard 
Bernstein – “the movement is everything, the end-aim (of socialism) 
nothing” – the SPD in its Bad Godesberg program of 1959 aban-
doned not just class struggle and nationalizations but, in a signifi-
cant concession to the ordoliberalism of Marktwirtschaft, its pro-
gram would state most dramatically that Germany needs “as much 
competition as possible and as much planning as necessary” (Sas-
soon 1996, 250). German trade unions were incorporated not only 
into government, but were also placed into boardrooms, “where 
unionists sat next to company directors, delivering wage restraint in 
return for power” (Varoufakis 2016, 63). French neo-revisionism, as 
we briefly stated above, began with the abandonment of the 
Keynesian program by Mitterrand in 1983. In Britain, matters were 
more complicated. The Labour Party had laid the foundations of the 
British welfare state in the 1940s, and the 1960s and 1970s were 
dominated by Labour governments’ resistance to any type of neo-
liberal reform, whether it came through the country’s EEC member-
ship or through internal pressure. It took the party sixteen years 
from 1979 – when it lost power to Thatcher’s triumphant neoliberal 
project amid a dramatic economic crisis – to come to grips with its 
commitment to socialism and nationalizations, abolishing the fa-
mous ‘Clause 4’ in 1994 under the neo-revisionist Third Way leader-
ship of Tony Blair. This neo-revisionist act, a direct concession to 
German ordoliberalism rather than Anglo-American neoliberalism, 
as we shall see below, paved Blair’s way to governmental power. Ef-
fectively, the Labour Party did not simply accept the new con-
straints imposed by Thatcher’s neoliberal reforms, setting out the 
new boundaries within which the political and economic game 
should take place; in the event, it began a journey as an active insti-
tutional participant in shaping and strengthening neoliberal finan-
cialization from positions of governmental power. Under Blair, the 
Labour Party became part-and-parcel of the process of the neoliber-
al financialization, adopting key tenets of German ordoliberalism 
from the EU, something that Thatcher had fought against. 
It should not be forgotten that Britain is a very peculiar case. 







the other in the world as a global imperial power. It preferred to 
manage German affairs and expansionist designs in East-Central 
Europe and the Balkans through France and French affairs and de-
signs through Germany. An off-shore balancer, Britain mastered 
the largest formal empire in history, only to lose its primacy and re-
treat, like other European colonial powers, after WWII. Because of 
its geographical position, naval-commercial power and the role of 
London as the globe’s main financial centre, Britain has always had 
a lukewarm relationship with Europe. Edward Heath, Britain’s Con-
servative PM in 1973 and the most pro-European Prime Minister 
Britain ever had, managed to overcome French – and inner-party – 
objections, achieving EEC membership. Labour had had the same 
internal divides, but the socialist star of Labour politics, Tony Benn, 
vehemently criticized the European project as a capitalist and un-
democratic endeavour. Thatcher herself – although she and the 
majority of her ruling group were arch neoliberals inspired by 
Hayek’s work – never agreed to concede monetary sovereignty to 
Brussels and, through it, to Germany. In her final parliamentary 
speech, on 22 November 1990, she would argue that Europe’s fu-
ture central bank would be accountable to no parliament and that 
such a bank would be completely undemocratic.5
Well, she was right. Not because she had any intention of criti-
cizing the EU from a socialist or social democratic position, as Tony 
Benn and others were doing at the time, but because her ideologi-
cal formation and political aim was to sustain a neoliberal project at 
home under the aegis of Westminster, while re-launching Britain as 
a neo-imperial power abroad, re-imagining/re-inventing the 
5   Thatcher answered the question by Alan Beith – a Liberal Democrat – 
about whether she would continue her fight against a single currency 
and an independent central bank as follows (before she could answer, an-
other MP interjected: “No, she’s going to be a governor”): “What a good 
idea”, Thatcher boasted, answering to the interjection. “I had not thought 
of it. But if I were, there would be no European Central Bank accountable 
to no one, least of all to national parliaments. Because under that kind of 
central bank there will be no democracy [and the central bank] taking 
powers away from every single parliament and be able to have a single 
currency and a monetary policy and an interest rate policy that takes 
away from us all political power” (Margaret Thatcher’s last speech as 
Prime Minister, 20 November 1990, available at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=uF_GXMxa-mE). 
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Empire. There are elements of realism in Thatcher’s view. By turn-
ing Britain into the globe’s financial hub in the era of globalization, 
Thatcherite neoliberalism aimed to transform Britain into the gate-
keeper of financialization and supply chains of global production 
networks, by-passing Europe, which was already dominated by Ger-
many. However, Blair’s Third Way neo-revisionism went beyond 
Thatcher’s Euroscepticism, embracing the ordoliberal agenda com-
prehensively.6
Blair’s New Labour assumed governmental power in 1996, in 
the midst of Bill Clinton’s successful Presidential terms, and when 
the bubble of neoliberal financialization was at full expansion. Wall 
Street and the City of London had already become the hubs of a 
triumphant global capitalism, delivering prosperity, low inflation, 
high financial profits, easy borrowing at tempting interest rates, 
and all this in an environment freed from any global competitor in 
the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states. 
It seemed like the ‘end of history’ was just around the corner. Un-
impeded, NATO and the EEC/EU headed eastwards, providing new 
members with security and neoliberal conditionality: you reform 
your economy in a free market direction ‘becoming prosperous like 
us’, and then you too can join the two clubs. Interestingly, what 
triggered the bombing of Belgrade and Yugoslavia in 1999 by 
NATO forces was the refusal on the part of the Yugoslav delegation 
at Rambouillet to the so-called ‘Appendix B’ (Fouskas 2003, 13-33), 
which stipulated, among other things, that Yugoslavia would ac-
cept free market economic principles (the other two conditions 
were that within three years the Kosovo-Albanians should be given 
the chance of voting for independence and possible annexation to 
Albania; and that NATO forces should be given permission to de-
ploy not only in Kosovo but anywhere in Yugoslavia). Blair’s New La-
bour was one of the most hawkish advocates of NATO’s bombing 
campaign, a fact that demonstrated clearly that the Third Way lacks 
any separate foreign policy instrument, as this is nothing more and 
nothing less than mere neo-imperialism led by the USA in post-Cold 
6   Today, after the Brexit vote of summer 2016, Blair fights for a second ref-
erendum hoping to “withdraw the withdrawal”, as the late Stephen Hase-







War conditions. But, in spite of this, did the Third Way have a dis-
tinct, progressive economic and social policy?
Tony Blair did not challenge the global neo-imperial role 
Thatcher envisaged for Britain in the context of neoliberal finan-
cialization. However, he perceived that role as being supplementa-
ry to Britain’s role in the EU. In this respect, he had been Britain’s 
ordoliberal politician par excellence. On more than one occasion, 
and having abolished the Labour Party’s constitutional commit-
ment to socialism as enshrined in Clause 4 before he assumed of-
fice, he stressed that 
old fashioned state intervention did not and cannot work. But 
neither does naïve reliance on markets. The government must 
promote competition, stimulating enterprise, flexibility and in-
novation by opening markets […] In government, in business, 
in our universities and throughout society we must do much 
more to foster a new entrepreneurial spirit (cited in Finlayson 
2003, 177-78).
Revealingly, in June 1998, Blair signed jointly with Gerhard 
Schröder, Germany’s Chancellor and SPD leader, a ‘working paper’ 
laying out in full the ordoliberal agenda of the Left in Europe (Blair 
and Schröder 1998). The initiative was sponsored by the SPD’s 
think-tank, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. The “trademark of this 
approach”, the two leaders argued, is the ‘New Centre’ in Germany 
and the Third Way in Britain. And after confirming that both politi-
cal forces “share a common destiny within the European Union”, 
they go on to assert that “the essential function of the market 
must be complemented and improved by political action, not ham-
pered by it.” Moreover, public expenditure is not an end in itself 
but must be used in order to “enable people to help themselves”. 
In a direct attack on the welfare state, “universal safeguards” must 
cease to be the norm, the paper argued; in their stead, what needs 
to be promoted is the “importance of individual and business en-
terprise to the creation of wealth”. “Left-wing” ideas, the paper 
continued, “should not become an ideological straitjacket” and glo-
balization should be promoted by government actions that “create 
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conditions in which existing business can prosper and adapt, and 
new businesses can be set up and grow” by way of boosting “effi-
ciency, competition and high performance”. And, in an attempt to 
address Europe’s unemployment challenge, which is “far too high” 
in some countries, the authors revealingly state: “To address this 
challenge, Europe’s social democrats must together formulate and 
implement a new supply-side agenda for the Left”, setting out a “ro-
bust competitive market framework” (our emphasis). This sup-
ply-side agenda is essential, as it will put a break on the govern-
ment’s borrowing requirement, addressing the issue of debt. Defi-
cit spending – one of the pillars of Keynesianism – should be avoid-
ed. Further, high taxation on corporations is excluded, because it 
reduces profits and competitiveness, while jeopardizing jobs. Hav-
ing a part-time job is better than having no job at all and “flexible 
markets are a modern social democratic aim”. The joint paper goes 
on to explain the notions of “human and social capital”, two fields 
that in a “modern service and knowledge-based economy” mean 
continuous education and vocational training, while public invest-
ment should be well-calculated and “directed at activities most 
beneficial to growth and fostering necessary structural change”. 
Blair openly embraced the agenda of Europe’s ordoliberal 
Left, embracing all of its postulates. Crucially, both leaders avoided 
the tackling of perplexing issues, such as the role of the ECB or the 
constraints imposed on each EU government by the EU’s ordoliber-
al acquis, issues that Thatcher tackled head-on by denouncing close 
links with the ‘Brussels bureaucracy’ as unaccountable and undem-
ocratic. At times, he – and Schröder, for that matter – conceived of 
the EU and the regulatory framework it provides somewhat disin-
genuously, stating that “companies must not be gagged by rules 
and regulations”, as if they were unaware of the EU’s cumbersome 
competition policy and anti-trust legislation. 
At home, Blair followed a two-prong ordoliberal policy. On the 
one hand, he conceded operational independence for setting inter-
est rates to the Bank of England in order to keep inflation under 
control but, on the other, he actively promoted asset price inflation 
(Kiely 2018, 158), especially in the housing sector, a key feature of 
the financialization bubble in the Anglo-American world and else-







chain blew up in 2007-08, necessitating the pumping of trillions of 
taxpayers´ money into the banking sector in order to save capital-
ism from total collapse, neither Schröder’s New Centre nor Blair’s 
Third Way can be considered innocent. They were directly involved 
in the shaping of neoliberal globalization/financialization by way of 
not just adopting the ordoliberal book in its entirety, but also by 
contributing to the writing of its very rules and misleading the pub-
lic that voted for them. 
The punishment, as well all know, did not take long to arrive. 
One after another, the ordoliberal/neo-revisionist Left parties 
across Europe collapsed, creating ample space for the emergence 
of the radical-xenophobic Right, but also for the radical Left. In 
some cases, such as the British Labour Party under the leadership 
of Jeremy Corbyn, ordoliberal leftist principles became thwarted 
from within the party. In others, such as in Spain, new Radical Left 
aggregations were born, contesting enduring austerity and bond-
age. In Greece, Syriza, a promising radical party, swept to power in 
January 2015 on an anti-austerity agenda, only to capitulate, after 
six months of bitter negotiations with the Troika and after 
over-turning a popular referendum outcome that voted against or-
doliberal austerity. At any event, the eurozone crisis was not just a 
lesson for the ordoliberal European Left; it represents a lesson for 
the ordoliberal movement as a whole. For all the safety valves and 
regulation guarantees offered by the strong hand of the ECB, the 
Commission, the Council and the European Court of Justice, free 
market capitalism proved to be an animal too difficult to tame. The 
ordoliberal Treaties of the EU proved to be useless pieces of paper, 
not worth the ink and paper used to pen them. The banking sector 
of the North Atlantic area was extremely intertwined: this is, in 
fact, one of the key dimensions of financialization. In the end, it re-
quired massive cynicism cum political anxiety on the part of the Eu-
ropean elites to launch an entire operation in which the core sur-
plus states of the EU could displace their banking crisis to periphery 
states (Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal), imposing on them un-
precedented austerity measures through bailout agreements of-
fered and imposed on humiliating, neo-colonial terms. Those who 
aspire to join the EU and the eurozone should think twice before 
they embark on such a trip.
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The trip was predictable. The Euro-sceptic Left had always crit-
icized the movement towards further European ‘integration’ on 
the basis of free markets, institutionally engineered by a frame-
work of rules shaped after the interest of the core surplus state, 
Germany (Fouskas 1997; Gowan 1999; Callinicos 2010). The Eu-
ro-sceptic Left put forth a socialist agenda at home first, in particu-
lar a program of green development and industrialization, un-
der-cutting the power of banks and finance, while boosting de-
mand and welfare institutions (Lapavitsas, 2018). Placing uneven 
(and combined) development at the centre of its investigation, this 
Left never believed that the European construction could create a 
European demos of equal states and national societies, where soli-
darity and amicability prevailed over the class interests of multina-
tional corporations and finance that lay at its core. The European 
periphery never managed to close the developmental gap with the 
core, with the introduction of the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
only serving to widen this gap, completely destroying the competi-
tive capacity of the periphery. Further, the EMU mechanism ex-
cludes external devaluation, the only apparent option being inter-
nal devaluation – a polite way to say austerity bondage. The euro-
zone crisis brought matters to a breaking point, especially with the 
case of Greece. The saga continues with the Brexit case, although 
Italy will soon bounce back as ‘Europe’s new sick man’. Unfortu-
nately, as we have tried to show in this contribution, the European 
Left has contributed to the rise of this exploitative ordoliberal sys-
tem and its crisis, and since 2009 it has further contributed to the 
ordoliberal management of the crisis with a harsh program of en-
during austerity. Thus, its electoral power and political influence is 
on the wane universally. Its fall is an indisputable matter of fact, al-
though its survival and renewal, it should be said, are completely 
dependent on the success of the austerity program across Europe, 
albeit possibly under different names, as appears to be the case in 
Greece and elsewhere. 
There is, as was stated in our opening comments, also a so-
phisticated branch of the Left, the Euro-Left. In its attempt to pro-







EU as a field of socialist action prone to the implementation of a 
socialist, post-Keynesian platform at the level of the EU itself. How-
ever, there is nothing more misleading than this. 
First of all, as we showed earlier, being a member of the EU/
eurozone, or even merely pegging your domestic currency to the 
euro, essentially means that you have already signed up to the poli-
cy of enduring austerity as applies across the EU/eurozone. Mem-
bership of the EU entails loss of national sovereignty and subscrip-
tion to the European acquis, which is anything but democratic and 
accountable to any national or European demos. 
Second, The EU is a hierarchical and disciplinarian structure of 
states, at the top of which stands Germany, the continent’s stron-
gest economy. Germany, with its ‘sound money’ ordoliberal policy, 
became the anchor country of the European system, providing it 
with a firm reference point. By the time the Maastricht Treaty was 
signed, Germany’s monetary policy, i.e. the Bundesbank’s anti-infla-
tion bias, was in charge of the situation. The ECB’s model is the 
de-politicized arrangement of the Bundesbank. Lapavitsas summa-
rizes this well:
In practice the ECB took the Bundesbank as its model and fo-
cused exclusively on maintaining a very low rate of inflation, 
without any obligation to finance fiscal deficits by member 
states. The ostensible logic was to ensure convergence of infla-
tion rates across EMU countries, thus making it possible to sta-
bilize international transactions in Europe and to sustain the 
monetary union. The actual outcome was that the operation of 
the common currency rebounded in the interests of German ex-
porting capital and the EMU became a domestic market for Ger-
man industry. (Lapavitsas 2018, 31).
With the Stability and Growth Pact regulating the fiscal perfor-
mance of the member states, austerity assumed an enduring em-
beddedness for all of them, insofar as budgets must always be bal-
anced and move within narrow limits, without a ‘bailout clause’. 
But when the crisis broke, even these arrangements were not suffi-
cient. New austerity-oriented treaties, such as the Fiscal Compact 
and the European Semester program, had to be envisaged, 
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bringing especially the debtor countries of the periphery to their 
knees at the very moment when Germany continued to register 
surpluses, while German and French banks were saved by the Greek 
and other taxpayers of the periphery, who in turn received bailout 
austerity packages. But the secret of the German success lies else-
where. It is to be found in the stagnation of wages from the late 
1990s onwards, the peculiarity of its financialized capitalism that 
allows accumulation of liquidity for massive lending, and the pro-
tection of an export-oriented manufacturing sector. The German 
success is not due to public and private investment in the country 
(Lapavitsas 2018, 64-5); it is the product of a deflationary policy 
and, hence, of a low exchange rate due to low nominal wage in-
creases. This protected the German exports in a highly competitive 
international environment: “In sum”, Lapavitsas writes, “Germany’s 
rising competitiveness since the late 1990s has been based less on 
its ability to raise output per person and more on its capacity to 
suppress compensation per person” (ibid. 49). Thus, the paramount 
concern of Germany becomes the paramount concern of the EU: 
prevent the monetary union from collapsing; defend the value of 
the euro as an international reserve currency so that EU/German 
products can compete internationally. Peripheral countries suffer 
more because their economies cannot compete with the core, es-
pecially since currency devaluation is not an option. 
Third, the European acquis is becoming increasingly cumber-
some, reactionary and regressive. Two rulings from the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2007, the Viking and Laval cases, have cre-
ated impediments to trade union activity in the EU with regard to 
postal workers. These are workers from one EU country being em-
ployed in another EU country but under the arrangements and con-
ditions of the country of origin, usually an Eastern European or Bal-
kan state, which are generally worse. The ECJ found that the trade 
unions of the host EU country cannot act to protect discriminatory 
wages, for example, for an Eastern European worker, because such 
an action would undermine the very premises of the single market. 
This is highly significant. Essentially, it demolishes the myth of pro-
gressive and pro-labour legislation on the part of the EU/ECJ, prior-
itizing the welfare of the single market, that is, protecting the price 







the so-called ‘Dublin Regulations’ regarding refugees, illegal immi-
grants and asylum seekers, or the despicable agreement between 
EU and Turkey over the same issue. The core aim of the ‘humanistic’ 
and ‘pro-solidarity’ EU was to protect its Marktwirtschaft, allow in 
as many refugees and immigrants as the system could profitably 
absorb, whereas all others, (amounting to hundreds of thousands 
of people), may be left eternally trapped in Turkey, Greece and the 
Western Balkans. But that is how imperialist powers behave: first 
causing havoc to entire societies in the MENA region and Central 
Asia by bombing them and instigating ethnic and religious wars of 
aggression in order to secure energy-related and other dividends, 
then attempting to block population movements on the ground as 
people’s lives in their homelands become unbearable.
Having said this, one conclusion seems to be inescapable, 
namely, that the Euro-Left ‘post-Keynesian’ project is, at best, uto-
pian and, at worst, a naïve interpretation of the EU Treaties. The 
Western Balkan states that aspire to become members of the EU, 
such as Serbia, may well think twice before they embark on such a 
predictable journey. 
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